Evaluation criteria provide a standard for quantifying the security of a computer system or network. These criteria include the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI), European Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), and the Common Criteria.
TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA (TCSEC)
- Measurement: Provides a metric for assessing comparative levels of trust between different computer systems.
- Guidance: Identifies standard security requirements that vendors must build into systems to achieve a given trust level.
- Acquisition: Provides customers a standard for specifying acquisition requirements and identifying systems that meet those requirements.
- Security policy: The rules and procedures by which a trusted system operates. Specific TCSEC requirements include
- Discretionary access control (DAC): Owners of objects are able to assign permissions to other subjects.
- Mandatory access control (MAC): Permissions to objects are managed centrally by an administrator.
- Object reuse: Protects confidentiality of objects that are reassigned after initial use. For example, a deleted file still exists on storage media; only the file allocation table (FAT) and first character of the file have been modified. Thus residual data may be restored, which describes the problem of data remanence. Object-reuse requirements define procedures for actually erasing the data.
- Labels: Sensitivity labels are required in MAC-based systems. Specific TCSEC labeling requirements include integrity, export, and subject/object labels.
- Assurance: Guarantees that a security policy is correctly implemented. Specific TCSEC requirements (listed here) are classified as operational assurance requirements:
- System architecture: TCSEC requires features and principles of system design that implement specific security features.
- System integrity: Hardware and firmware operate properly and are tested to verify proper operation.
- Covert channel analysis: TCSEC requires covert channel analysis that detects unintended communication paths not protected by a system’s normal security mechanisms. A covert storage channel conveys information by altering stored system data. A covert timing channel conveys information by altering a system resource’s performance or timing.
- REMEMBER
- A systems or security architect must understand covert channels and how they work in order to prevent the use of covert channels in the system environment
- Accountability: The ability to associate users and processes with their actions. Specific TCSEC requirements include
- Identification and authentication (I&A): Systems need to track who performs what activities.
- Trusted Path: A direct communications path between the user and the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) that doesn’t require interaction with untrusted applications or operating-system layers.
- Audit: Recording, examining, analyzing, and reviewing security-related activities in a trusted system.
- Documentation: Specific TCSEC requirements include
- Security Features User’s Guide (SFUG): User’s manual for the system.
- Trusted Facility Manual (TFM): System administrator’s and/or security administrator’s manual.
- Test documentation: According to the TCSEC manual, this documentation must be in a position to “show how the security mechanisms were tested, and results of the security mechanisms’ functional testing.”
- Design documentation: Defines system boundaries and internal components, such as the Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
- D: Minimal protection
- C: Discretionary protection (C1 and C2)
- B: Mandatory protection (B1, B2, and B3)
- A: Verified protection (A1)
- It addresses only confidentiality issues. It doesn’t include integrity and availability.
- It isn’t applicable to most commercial systems.
- It emphasizes protection from unauthorized access, despite statistical evidence that many security violations involve insiders.
- It doesn’t address networking issues.
- It addresses only confidentiality issues. It doesn’t include integrity and availability.
- It isn’t applicable to most commercial systems.
- It emphasizes protection from unauthorized access, despite statistical evidence that many security violations involve insiders.
- It doesn’t address networking issues.
ClassName Sample Requirements D Minimal protection Reserved for systems that fail evaluation. C1 Discretionary protection (DAC) System doesn’t need to distinguish between individual users and types of access. C2 Controlled access protection (DAC) System must distinguish between individual users and types of access; object reuse security features required. B1 Labeled security protection (MAC) Sensitivity labels required for all subjects and storage objects. B2 Structured protection (MAC) Sensitivity labels required for all subjects and objects; trusted path requirements. B3 Security domains (MAC) Access control lists (ACLs) are specifically required; system must protect against covert channels. A1 Verified design (MAC) Formal Top-Level Specification (FTLS) required; configuration management procedures must be enforced throughout entire system lifecycle. Beyond A1 Self-protection and reference monitors are implemented in the Trusted Computing Base (TCB). TCB verified to source-code level.
TRUSTED NETWORK INTERPRETATION (TNI)
EUROPEAN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY EVALUATION CRITERIA (ITSEC)
(F) Class (E) Level Description NA E0 Equivalent to TCSEC level D F-C1 E1 Equivalent to TCSEC level C1 F-C2 E2 Equivalent to TCSEC level C2 F-B1 E3 Equivalent to TCSEC level B1 F-B2 E4 Equivalent to TCSEC level B2 F-B3 E5 Equivalent to TCSEC level B3 F-B3 E6 Equivalent to TCSEC level A1 F-IN NA TOEs with high integrity requirements F-AV NA TOEs with high availability requirements F-DI NA TOEs with high integrity requirements during data communication F-DC NA TOEs with high confidentiality requirements during data communication F-DX NA Networks with high confidentiality and integrity requirements COMMON CRITERIA
Level TCSEC Equivalent ITSEC Equivalent Description EAL0 N/A N/A Inadequate assurance EAL1 N/A N/A Functionally tested EAL2 C1 E1 Structurally tested EAL3 C2 E2 Methodically tested and checked EAL4 B1 E3 Methodically designed, tested, and reviewed EAL5 B2 E4 Semi-formally designed and tested EAL6 B3 E5 Semi-formally verified design and tested EAL7 A1 E6
TRUSTED NETWORK INTERPRETATION (TNI)
EUROPEAN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY EVALUATION CRITERIA (ITSEC)
(F) Class (E) Level Description NA E0 Equivalent to TCSEC level D F-C1 E1 Equivalent to TCSEC level C1 F-C2 E2 Equivalent to TCSEC level C2 F-B1 E3 Equivalent to TCSEC level B1 F-B2 E4 Equivalent to TCSEC level B2 F-B3 E5 Equivalent to TCSEC level B3 F-B3 E6 Equivalent to TCSEC level A1 F-IN NA TOEs with high integrity requirements F-AV NA TOEs with high availability requirements F-DI NA TOEs with high integrity requirements during data communication F-DC NA TOEs with high confidentiality requirements during data communication F-DX NA Networks with high confidentiality and integrity requirements COMMON CRITERIA
Level TCSEC Equivalent ITSEC Equivalent Description EAL0 N/A N/A Inadequate assurance EAL1 N/A N/A Functionally tested EAL2 C1 E1 Structurally tested EAL3 C2 E2 Methodically tested and checked EAL4 B1 E3 Methodically designed, tested, and reviewed EAL5 B2 E4 Semi-formally designed and tested EAL6 B3 E5 Semi-formally verified design and tested EAL7 A1 E6 Formally verified design and tested Formally verified design and tested
- Accountability: The ability to associate users and processes with their actions. Specific TCSEC requirements include